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We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed ﬁrms and ﬁnd that it is easier for
ﬁrms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended
debt maturities than it is for ﬁrms without political connections. Our investiga-
tion indicates that this phenomenon is signiﬁcantly less common with
increased media monitoring. Houston et al. (2011) ﬁnd strong evidence that
the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corrup-
tion in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring
can curb corruption.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong.1. Introduction
Some researchers have found that non-state-owned ﬁrms with political connections can secure preferential
access to ﬁnancing and tax breaks (e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Luo
and Zhen, 2008; Wang and Wang, 2013; Yu and Pan, 2008). Yet there are also disadvantages to ﬁrms settingYat-sen
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ﬁrm value and performance (Liu et al., 2010). For example, Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and
Faccio and Parsley (2009) ﬁnd that political connections can improve ﬁrm performance and value. However,
other studies come to the opposite conclusion, such as Fan et al. (2007), who ﬁnd that the accounting and
market performance of ﬁrms with political connections are signiﬁcantly lower than those of other ﬁrms after
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), due to a lack of managerial capabilities. Thus, further study is clearly needed to
determine why these empirical results diverge and to identify the internal mechanisms of political connections
that aﬀect ﬁrms.
There are at least two theories that can explain the existence and mechanisms of political connections. First,
reputation theory emphasizes the importance of relationships, using a reputation enhancement argument that
suggests that the political connections of ﬁrm executives serve as an alternative channel for establishing ﬁrm
reputation when quality disclosure is absent (Sun et al., 2005; Yu and Pan, 2008). Second, rent-seeking theory
also explains political connections by arguing that ﬁrms use them to engage in activities that inﬂuence the gov-
ernment’s approval decisions and government oﬃcials then show partiality to ﬁrms whose executives promise
these oﬃcials personal favors. In other words, the approval decision process is inﬂuenced by oﬃcials desire to
seek rents (e.g., Fan et al., 2007).
Which theory more eﬀectively explains the existence and mechanisms of political connections in the Chinese
stock market? In this study, we attempt to answer this question from a media monitoring perspective. Based
on the extant research, we investigate how media monitoring aﬀects the relationship between political connec-
tions and long-term loans. We anticipate that ﬁrms with political connections can more easily obtain long-
term loans with extended debt maturities. On the surface, the phenomenon can be explained by both theories,
so determining which is more signiﬁcant requires deeper study. If the reputation theory is more signiﬁcant,
then we would expect the relationship between political connections and long-term loans to be reinforced
by improved media monitoring, because ﬁrms’ reputations can be strengthened by media exposure. If the
rent-seeking theory is more signiﬁcant, we expect the relationship to be reduced by improved media monitor-
ing because most rent-seeking behavior is unlawful and irrational, and thus the role of political connections
should be weakened by media exposure.
Using data for Chinese non-state-owned listed ﬁrms from 2006 to 2012, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with political
connections have easier access to long-term loans with extended debt maturities. This result suggests that
political connections facilitate ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing. We also ﬁnd that the relationship between political connec-
tions and long-term loans is signiﬁcantly reduced with improved media monitoring. Overall, our ﬁndings sup-
port the rent-seeking theory.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, previous studies have not distinguished
between these two theories, such that research based on one cannot exclude the other. This study diﬀerentiates
between these two theories and analyzes which is better suited to the Chinese stock market. Second, the role of
the media in China is highly suspect due to a higher degree of government intervention. Houston et al. (2011)
note a strong correlation between state-funded media and banking corruption. According to their study, it is
diﬃcult for the Chinese media to play a role in suppressing corruption, but we observe that it can play an
important role in inhibiting rent-seeking, which can be explained by the market-oriented media reform of
recent years. Our empirical evidence therefore provides some support for the role of the media in China, which
subsequent studies can further investigate.
2. Institutional background, theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
2.1. Institutional background
Due to ideological factors and compared with state-owned ﬁrms, non-state-owned ﬁrms face unfair market
conditions, also known as “tilted playing ﬁeld” problems. The constraints on non-state-owned ﬁrm develop-
ment mainly include legal obstacles, government intervention or administration and ﬁnancing diﬃculties (Bai
et al., 2003). Another problem for non-state-owned listed ﬁrms is related to stock market development. The
Chinese stock market is a burgeoning traditional planned economy and socialist market economic system pur-
suing state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. The central and local governments have rapidly recognized the
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was the result of the SOEs general ineﬃciency, which led to the stock-issuing system and the complication of
SOE reforms. This indicates that SOEs inevitably dominate the Chinese stock market. Although non-SOEs
can list through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and management buyout (MBO) markets, SOEs still dom-
inate the stock market because the M&A and MBO markets are largely controlled by governments and SOEs.
Thus, the majority of Chinese listed ﬁrms are ultimately under government control (Liu et al., 2003). Hence,
non-state-owned listed ﬁrms naturally face tilted playing ﬁeld problems such as those listed below.
First, there are several legal and administrative barriers for non-state-owned listed ﬁrms. According to
Chen et al. (2008), the proportion of non-state-owned listed ﬁrms is less than 20% in high-barrier industries
such as automotive, marine and road and rail transportation—far below the proportion of SOEs. The propor-
tion of non-state-owned listed ﬁrms in moderate- and low-barrier industries is about 30–50% and/or exceeds
that of SOEs, respectively. These results reﬂect the ubiquity of barriers, such as legal and administrative, for
non-state-owned listed ﬁrms in high-barrier industries.
Second, non-state-owned listed ﬁrms in China are developing serious ﬁnancing diﬃculties in that they are
unable to gain adequate external ﬁnancing in the stock market or from the banking system, the latter of which
exhibits credit discrimination. Banks, especially those that are state-owned, prefer to provide loans to SOEs
rather than to non-state-owned listed ﬁrms. In the past 10 years, while non-state-owned ﬁrms contribution
to Chinese GDP exceeded 70%, they obtained less than 20% of the bank loans (Lu and Yao, 2004). On the
stock market, in the early 1990s, non-state-owned ﬁrms could not easily achieve listing directly through IPOs
due to the stock market’s burden in serving the SOE reform. Given the reform, some non-state-owned ﬁrms
had to initially list through the takeover market or buy shell resources1 from SOEs, but the quality of such re-
sources was typically low because SOEs and governments preferred not to sell high-quality shell resources
(Wang et al., 2001). These details explain why non-state-owned listed ﬁrms proﬁtability is generally not as
good as that of SOEs, despite the former’s superior system design, corporate government and ownership struc-
ture. Gaining a low-quality shell does not solve non-state-owned listed ﬁrms ﬁnancing problems, and neither
does equity reﬁnancing, according to Chen et al. (2008), due to low beneﬁts and government intervention.
Given non-state-owned listed ﬁrms tilted playing ﬁeld problems, they should use the following measures to
avoid constraints. First, they should seek political connections to avoid the negative eﬀects of laws and
governmental regulations (Fan et al., 2007). Second, they should solve their ﬁnancing diﬃculties through
political connections and the leakage eﬀect to seek informal ﬁnancial support (Lu and Yao, 2004; Yu and
Pan, 2008).2.2. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
The two theories considered in this study—reputation and rent-seeking—are used to analyze the relation-
ship between political connections and long-term loans.
Based on reputation theory, Sun et al. (2005) suggest that ﬁrms’ political connections are important aspects
of their reputations that are likely to prompt government intervention. Moreover, while it may help ﬁrms
avoid trouble, government intervention is not always to a ﬁrm’s beneﬁt, nor does it line up with the ﬁrm’s
social goals or oﬃcial interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). La Porta et al. (2002) demonstrate that ﬁrms with
political connections easily gain government subsidies when they are not facing diﬃculties in their
business operations.
Against the background of the public property system, political connections aﬀect ﬁrms long-term loans
and debt maturities in the following ways. First, ﬁrms with political connections can easily acquire long-term
loans because they can use subsidies to reduce the possibility of default. Likewise, banks prefer to give them
loans because the possibility of default is relatively low.
Second, ﬁrms with political connections can directly inﬂuence bank lending decisions and gain more long-
term loans to avoid the uncertainty inherent in the rotation of oﬃcials (Sun et al., 2005). Thus, our ﬁrst
hypothesis is:1 Shell resources refer to listed ﬁrms that are small in size or exhibit poor performance or operational diﬃculties.
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and have longer debt maturities than non-state-owned listed ﬁrms without political connections.
Similarly, the rent-seeking theory also supports H1, but unlike the reputation theory, it stresses that man-
agers should establish and use political connections to gain excess proﬁts, which is commonly regarded as a
non-productive activity and as unfair social behavior. Rent-seeking behavior leads to government intervention
and non-state-owned listed ﬁrms with political connections can gain more long-term loans through their rent-
seeking for governments or banks, especially state-owned banks.
Although H1 is supported by both theories, the reputation theory emphasizes political connections as a
positive reaction to market and legal failures, and as an eﬀective alternative to the formal system. In contrast,
the rent-seeking theory suggests that ﬁrms with political connections are likely to take advantage of govern-
ment intervention and slip through policies, such that there is a close relation between political connections
and corruption.
We address which theory more eﬀectively explains political connections and their functional mechanisms by
distinguishing between them from a media supervision perspective. First, we introduce the background of
media monitoring in the Chinese stock market. In recent years, the media as an important external governance
mechanism has received widespread attention for its inﬂuence over the stock market in China. The following
are the most important characteristics of media monitoring in the Chinese stock market.
First, the inﬂuence of state-owned media is signiﬁcantly higher than that of other media (Yang and Ling,
2011) because the four major securities newspapers—regarded as the most inﬂuential—are state-owned.
Second, most media, especially state-owned media, involve multi-tasking—the presence of which creates a
mixture of administration and marketing. Media coverage not only needs to obey government control require-
ments, but also has to adapt to the market’s development while meeting readers needs.
Third, the depth and breadth of media reports are improving as the stock market develops.
Although the media in China must operate under government controls, they can still pursue their own util-
ity maximization for market purposes, typically by exhibiting a preference for inﬂammatory news, social hot
spots and contentious phenomena. The media’s behavior has been reported as inﬂuencing corporations and
corporate governance (Dyck et al., 2008; Miller, 2006; Houston et al., 2011; Li and Shen, 2010; Yang and
Zhao, 2012). According to Dyck et al. (2008), the media inﬂuences corporate governance through supervision
or reputation mechanisms. Under the supervision mechanism, the media reveals improper behavior with the
aid of administrative and external supervision and internal governance that ultimately constrain ﬁrms’ mis-
conduct (Li and Shen, 2010). Under the reputation mechanism, the media inﬂuences managers’ reputations,
which is considered an important governance function. Managers considering future employment and wages
actively respond to media reports that might aﬀect their reputations.
If the rent-seeking theory more eﬀectively explains the presence and function of political connections, then
we would expect media monitoring to reduce the role played by political connections due to the close relation
between corruption and rent-seeking behavior. As a non-productive activity, rent-seeking should decrease as
media coverage increases.2
Hypothesis 2a. The relationship between political connections and long-term loans decreases as media
coverage increases.
In contrast, if political connections are better explained by reputation theory, then we can draw an alter-
native hypothesis to H2a, because a ﬁrm’s political relationships are seen as its reputation. The behavior of
establishing and using political relationships is, in essence, market oriented. We argue that such behavior is
not restricted by media coverage.
Hypothesis 2b. The relationship between political connections and long-term loans is not signiﬁcantly reduced
by increased media coverage.2 According to Dyck et al. (2008) and Miller (2006), media coverage is considered to be a proxy variable for media monitoring.
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3.1. Data
We draw our sample from A-share non-state-owned listed ﬁrms in the 2006–2012 period, during which the
numbers of non-ﬁnancial listed companies provided by the WIND database were 1420, 1521, 1575, 1721,
2072, 2301 and 2422, respectively. On this basis, after deleting those in the growth enterprises market
(GEM), those that were state-owned and those missing the main variable, our ﬁnal sample is comprised of
5215 ﬁrms that met the data requirements for our hypotheses testing. The observations by year are 500,
562, 619, 673, 846, 978 and 1037, respectively. The data in this study consist of political connections that were
manually collected by reading annual reports (the deﬁnitions for political connections appear in Table 1) and
the media monitoring or coverage details and other ﬁnancial data, which were manually collected from the
WIND database. The WIND database includes everyday news reports on Chinese listed ﬁrms from more than
100 important newspapers. According to Yang and Zhao (2012), the data on media monitoring or coverage in
the WIND database mainly cover the ﬁnancial media reports of Chinese listed ﬁrms.
3.2. Research design
We use the following model to test H1:Table
Variab
Variab
BANK
BANK
ZG1
ZG2
ZG3
ZG4
MC
MCZG
MCZG
MCZG
MCZG
ROA
Grow
Liq
TobinQ
Tangib
SizeBanki;t ¼ aþb1ZGi;tþb2ROAi;tþb3Growi;tþb4Liqi;tþb5TobinQi;tþb6Tangiblei;tþb7Sizei;tþ e ð1Þ
where subscript i is the sample ﬁrm, subscript t is the year in the sample period and Bank is a dependent var-
iable comprising Bank1 and Bank2. According to Yu and Pan (2008), the ﬁrst dependent variable is Bank1,
which equals long-term loans. Sun et al. (2005) argue that the second dependent variable is Bank2, which
equals debt maturities.
ZG is an independent variable that measures political relations, and comprises ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4,
which are calculated as follows. ZG1 equals 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former
government oﬃcial, and 0 otherwise. ZG2 equals 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or
former government oﬃcial, or a current or former National People’s Congress (NPC) oﬃcial or the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative (CPPC) oﬃcial, and 0 otherwise. ZG3 equals 3, 2 or 1 if the chairman or the1
le deﬁnitions.
le Deﬁnition
1 Long-term loans divided by total assets
2 Long-term loans divided by the sum of long-term loans, short-term loans and short-term accounts payable
ZG1 equals 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former government oﬃcial, and 0 otherwise
ZG2 equals 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former government oﬃcial,
or National People’s Congress (NPC) oﬃcial or Chinese People’s Political Consultative (CPPC) oﬃcial, and 0 otherwise
ZG3 equals 3, 2 or 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former central, provincial or city and
county government oﬃcial, respectively, and 0 otherwise
ZG4 equals 3, 2 and 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former central, provincial or city and county
government oﬃcial (including NPC and CPPC oﬃcials), respectively, and 0 otherwise
LN(the number of media coverage + 1)
1 The interaction between MC and ZG1
2 The interaction between MC and ZG2
3 The interaction between MC and ZG3
4 The interaction between MC and ZG4
Return on assets
Sales growth
Liquidity ratio
Tobin’s Q ratio
le The sum of ﬁxed assets and accumulated depreciation divided by total assets
Ln(total assets)
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for political connections.
ZG1 ZG2 ZG3 ZG4
Mean 0.187 0.452 0.280 0.838
Median 0 0 0 0
Standard deviation 0.390 0.498 0.655 1.068
Max 1 1 3 3
Min 0 0 0 0
N 5215 5215 5215 5215
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for other variables.
Sample Bank1 Bank2 MC ROA Grow Liq TobinQ Tangible Size
ZG1 = 0 0.038 0.178 3.552 7.215 19.589 2.605 2.556 0.226 21.188
0.000 0.035 3.479 6.740 13.640 1.530 1.979 0.200 21.129
0.068 0.257 0.783 8.284 49.061 3.357 1.958 0.155 1.019
4242 3618 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242
ZG1 = 1 0.045 0.215 3.486 6.735 20.152 2.517 2.615 0.215 21.126
0.000 0.061 3.401 6.180 11.950 1.590 1.957 0.188 21.129
0.075 0.281 0.780 8.967 58.025 3.146 2.066 0.161 1.001
973 838 973 973 973 973 973 973 973
Total sample 0.039 0.185 3.539 7.125 19.694 2.589 2.567 0.224 21.176
0.000 0.040 3.466 6.650 13.360 1.540 1.977 0.198 21.129
0.070 0.262 0.783 8.417 50.848 3.318 1.978 0.156 1.016
5215 4456 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
T 2.785*** 3.327*** 2.374** 1.603 0.315 0.748 0.838 2.128** 1.725*
Z 2.16** 2.728*** 2.261** 2.017** 1.447 0.143 0.161 2.792*** 1.265
Note: The T statistic is for mean tests between the groups ZG1 = 0 and ZG1 = 1; the Z statistic is for Wilcoxon tests between the groups
ZG1 = 0 and ZG1 = 1.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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and 0 otherwise. ZG4 equals 3, 2 or 1 if the chairman or the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former central,
provincial or city and county government oﬃcial (including NPC or CPPC oﬃcials), respectively, and 0 other-
wise. This design facilitates our ability to quantize political relations.
If the regression coeﬃcients of ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4 are signiﬁcantly positive in model (1), then H1 is
supported.
In model (1), we choose control variables according to Sun et al. (2005) and Lu et al. (2008). The speciﬁc
deﬁnitions of the control variables are shown in Table 1.
We use the following model to test H2:Banki;t ¼ aþ b1ZGi;t þ b2MCi;t þ b3MCZGi;t þ b4ROAi;t þ b5Growi;t þ b6Liqi;t þ b7TobinQi;t
þ b8Sizei;t þ e ð2Þwhere subscript i is the sample ﬁrm, subscript t is the year in the sample period, Bank’s deﬁnition is identical to
that in model (1), MC is an independent variable reﬂecting media monitoring following Dyck et al. (2008) and
Core et al. (2008) and MCZG1, MCZG2, MCZG3 and MCZG4 represent interactions between MC and ZG1,
ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4, respectively. The control variables in models (1) and (2) are identical.
If H2a (H2b) is supported, the regression coeﬃcients of MCZG1, MCZG2, MCZG3 and MCZG4 should
be signiﬁcantly negative (positive) in model (2).
Table 4
Regression results for model (1).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.404***
(0.0000)
0.398***
(0.0000)
0.402***
(0.0000)
0.394***
(0.0000)
1.465***
(0.0000)
1.434***
(0.0000)
1.458***
(0.0000)
1.419***
(0.0000)
ZG1 0.0083**
(0.0438)
0.0409***
(0.0058)
ZG2 0.0050*
(0.0618)
0.0224
(0.3243)
ZG3 0.0038
(0.1103)
0.0212**
(0.0183)
ZG4 0.0021*
(0.0538)
0.0086**
(0.0453)
ROA 0.0004*
(0.0814)
0.0004*
(0.0669)
0.0004*
(0.0864)
0.0004*
(0.0710)
0.0002
(0.8194)
0.0001
(0.8645)
0.0002
(0.8063)
0.0001
(0.8608)
Grow 0.0001**
(0.0356)
0.0001**
(0.0329)
0.0001**
(0.0350)
0.0001**
(0.0312)
0.0002
(0.1030)
0.0002
(0.1009)
0.0002
(0.1004)
0.0002*
(0.0946)
Liq 0.0016***
(0.0000)
0.0016***
(0.0000)
0.0016***
(0.0000)
0.0016***
(0.0000)
0.0195***
(0.0000)
0.0191***
(0.0000)
0.0195***
(0.0000)
0.0192***
(0.0000)
TobinQ 0.0000
(0.9994)
0.0000
(0.9692)
0.0000
(0.9755)
0.0000
(0.9885)
0.0042
(0.2156)
0.0042
(0.2318)
0.0040
(0.2419)
0.0040
(0.2659)
Tangible 0.0383**
(0.0211)
0.0377**
(0.0230)
0.0383**
(0.0215)
0.0376**
(0.0236)
0.0422
(0.4107)
0.0387
(0.4487)
0.0428
(0.4065)
0.0387
(0.4497)
Size 0.0207***
(0.0000)
0.0204***
(0.0000)
0.0206***
(0.0000)
0.0202***
(0.0000)
0.0743***
(0.0000)
0.0728***
(0.0000)
0.0740***
(0.0000)
0.0722***
(0.0000)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 4456 4456 4456 4456
Adj. R-sq 0.114 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.102 0.100 0.101 0.099
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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can be divided into two groups: high (higher than the sample’s median) and low media coverage.
If H2a is supported, the relationship between political connections and long-term loans and extended debt
maturities should be stronger (weaker) in the low (high) media coverage subsample. If H2b is supported, the
relationship between political connections and long-term loans and extended debt maturities should be weaker
(stronger) in the low (high) media coverage subsample.3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for political connections: 18.7% of the ﬁrms had a chairman or
CEO that was a current or former government oﬃcial—45.27% when NPC and CPPC oﬃcials are included.
This suggests that having political connections is fairly popular.
Table 3, which provides the descriptive statistics of the other variables, shows that non-state-owned listed
ﬁrms with political connections have signiﬁcantly more long-term loans and longer debt maturities than those
without political connections, in addition to lower MC and better performance (ROA). All of the continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.4. Empirical analysis
Table 4 reports the regression results of model (1). After controlling for other factors, the results show that
politically connected ﬁrms have access to extended debt maturities and more long-term loans. The regression
Table 5
Regression results for model (2).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.441***
(0.000)
0.446***
(0.000)
0.442***
(0.000)
0.441***
(0.000)
1.420***
(0.000)
1.458***
(0.000)
1.422***
(0.000)
1.459***
(0.000)
ZG1 0.010 (0.311) 0.048 (0.244)
ZG2 0.019**
(0.017)
0.112***
(0.001)
ZG3 0.011*
(0.073)
0.054**
(0.029)
ZG4 0.008**
(0.023)
0.061***
(0.000)
Mc 0.002
(0.261)
0.000
(0.853)
0.001
(0.386)
0.001
(0.606)
0.009 (0.129) 0.019***
(0.005)
0.011*
(0.062)
0.020***
(0.002)
MCZG1 0.002
(0.380)
0.010
(0.408)
MCZG2 0.004*
(0.079)
0.027***
(0.002)
MCZG3 0.003*
(0.071)
0.013*
(0.051)
MCZG4 0.002
(0.107)
0.015***
(0.000)
ROA 0.000
(0.358)
0.000
(0.342)
0.000
(0.354)
0.000
(0.353)
0.001**
(0.029)
0.001**
(0.031)
0.001**
(0.030)
0.001**
(0.030)
Grow 0.000***
(0.003)
0.000***
(0.003)
0.000***
(0.002)
0.000***
(0.002)
0.000 (0.137) 0.000 (0.138) 0.000 (0.128) 0.000 (0.128)
Liq 0.001**
(0.037)
0.001**
(0.026)
0.001**
(0.036)
0.001**
(0.025)
0.024***
(0.000)
0.024***
(0.000)
0.024***
(0.000)
0.024***
(0.000)
TobinQ 0.001
(0.193)
0.001
(0.185)
0.001
(0.200)
0.001
(0.156)
0.000 (0.919) 0.000 (0.925) 0.000 (0.922) 0.000 (0.984)
Tangible 0.083***
(0.000)
0.083***
(0.000)
0.083***
(0.000)
0.083***
(0.000)
0.233***
(0.000)
0.232***
(0.000)
0.232***
(0.000)
0.232***
(0.000)
Size 0.022***
(0.000)
0.022***
(0.000)
0.022***
(0.000)
0.022***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 4456 4456 4456 4456
Adj. R-sq 0.233 0.235 0.234 0.235 0.228 0.230 0.228 0.230
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
172 D. Yang et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 165–177results in columns (1)–(8) of Table 4, in which the explanatory variables are Bank1 and Bank2, show that the
ZG (including ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4) coeﬃcients are positive at the 10% signiﬁcance level, with the excep-
tion of columns (3) and (6). However, the results in Table 4 can be used to support the reputation theory; spe-
ciﬁcally, that ﬁrms with political connections tend to be regarded as having good reputations and thus banks
are willing to provide them with more long-term loans. The results can also be used to support the rent-seeking
theory; speciﬁcally, that ﬁrms with political connections gain more long-term loans and extended debt matu-
rities through rent-seeking.
Two methods are used to test H2. The ﬁrst is model (2), and the relevant regression results are shown in
Table 5. The regression coeﬃcients of ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4 are positive, which indicate that politically
connected ﬁrms get more long-term loans and extended debt maturities. The coeﬃcients of MCZG1, MCZG2,
MCZG3 and MCZG4 are negative and nearly all pass the signiﬁcance test.
The second method is subsample regressions based on the median of MC. If MC is greater (less) than the
median, it is in the group with strong (weak) media monitoring. Then, we perform regressions using model (1)
Table 6
Subsample regression results for model (1).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Constant 0.332***
(0.000)
0.495***
(0.000)
0.332***
(0.000)
0.493***
(0.000)
0.331***
(0.000)
0.494***
(0.000)
0.329***
(0.000)
0.489***
(0.000)
1.187***
(0.000)
1.533***
(0.000)
1.190***
(0.000)
1.530***
(0.000)
1.185***
(0.000)
1.527***
(0.000)
1.172***
(0.000)
1.540***
(0.000)
ZG1 0.007**
(0.024)
0.003
(0.311)
0.029**
(0.019)
0.001
(0.925)
ZG2 0.005**
(0.044)
0.005**
(0.048)
0.027**
(0.011)
0.004
(0.711)
ZG3 0.004**
(0.014)
0.003*
(0.090)
0.022***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.491)
ZG4 0.002*
(0.064)
0.002*
(0.067)
0.016***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.633)
ROA 0.000
(0.970)
0.000*
(0.070)
0.000
(0.923)
0.000*
(0.064)
0.000
(0.990)
0.000*
(0.066)
0.000
(0.928)
0.000*
(0.068)
0.000
(0.471)
0.001**
(0.040)
0.000
(0.504)
0.001**
(0.040)
0.001
(0.436)
0.001**
(0.041)
0.000
(0.484)
0.001**
(0.040)
Grow 0.000***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.227)
0.000***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.234)
0.000***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.224)
0.000***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.235)
0.000**
(0.025)
0.000
(0.668)
0.000**
(0.022)
0.000
(0.661)
0.000**
(0.023)
0.000
(0.674)
0.000**
(0.020)
0.000
(0.677)
Liq 0.001*
(0.071)
0.000
(0.637)
0.001*
(0.057)
0.000
(0.595)
0.001*
(0.068)
0.000
(0.611)
0.001*
(0.054)
0.000
(0.623)
0.020***
(0.000)
0.039***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
0.039***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
0.039***
(0.000)
0.019***
(0.000)
0.039***
(0.000)
TobinQ 0.000
(0.888)
0.002*
(0.068)
0.000
(0.886)
0.002*
(0.051)
0.000
(0.840)
0.002*
(0.073)
0.000
(0.849)
0.002**
(0.046)
0.005
(0.160)
0.008**
(0.035)
0.005
(0.174)
0.008**
(0.035)
0.005
(0.183)
0.007**
(0.038)
0.005
(0.207)
0.007**
(0.038)
Tangible 0.085***
(0.000)
0.077***
(0.000)
0.085***
(0.000)
0.077***
(0.000)
0.085***
(0.000)
0.076***
(0.000)
0.084***
(0.000)
0.077***
(0.000)
0.277***
(0.000)
0.207***
(0.000)
0.278***
(0.000)
0.207***
(0.000)
0.278***
(0.000)
0.207***
(0.000)
0.278***
(0.000)
0.207***
(0.000)
Size 0.017***
(0.000)
0.024***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.000)
0.023***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.000)
0.024***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.000)
0.023***
(0.000)
0.060***
(0.000)
0.072***
(0.000)
0.060***
(0.000)
0.071***
(0.000)
0.060***
(0.000)
0.071***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
0.072***
(0.000)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 2655 2560 2655 2560 2655 2560 2655 2560 2192 2264 2192 2264 2192 2264 2192 2264
Adj. R-sq 0.174 0.285 0.174 0.285 0.174 0.285 0.173 0.285 0.184 0.272 0.185 0.272 0.185 0.272 0.186 0.272
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), (11), (13) and (15) are the results for the low media coverage group (coverage is lower than the median) and the others are the results for the high media
coverage group.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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Table 7
Regression results for model (1) (using lagged variables).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.344***
(0.000)
0.337***
(0.000)
0.343***
(0.000)
0.326***
(0.000)
1.125***
(0.000)
1.084***
(0.000)
1.119***
(0.000)
1.044***
(0.000)
ZG1_lag 0.006 (0.125) 0.041**
(0.015)
ZG2_lag 0.010***
(0.007)
0.041***
(0.004)
ZG3_lag 0.004 (0.167) 0.024**
(0.016)
ZG4_lag 0.006***
(0.003)
0.021***
(0.005)
ROA_lag 0.000
(0.643)
0.000
(0.601)
0.000
(0.657)
0.000
(0.616)
0.002*
(0.075)
0.002*
(0.074)
0.002*
(0.073)
0.002*
(0.072)
Grow_lag 0.000
(0.792)
0.000
(0.776)
0.000
(0.797)
0.000
(0.778)
0.000
(0.143)
0.000
(0.122)
0.000
(0.148)
0.000
(0.124)
Liq_lag 0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.006**
(0.024)
0.006**
(0.025)
0.006**
(0.026)
0.006**
(0.026)
TobinQ_lag 0.001
(0.663)
0.001
(0.613)
0.001
(0.650)
0.001
(0.541)
0.000 (0.975) 0.000
(0.972)
0.000 (1.000) 0.001
(0.911)
Tangible_lag 0.024 (0.144) 0.023 (0.154) 0.024 (0.144) 0.023 (0.151) 0.030
(0.589)
0.035
(0.515)
0.028
(0.613)
0.034
(0.527)
Size_lag 0.018***
(0.000)
0.018***
(0.000)
0.018***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.000)
0.061***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
0.061***
(0.000)
0.057***
(0.000)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 4175 4175 4175 4175 3586 3586 3586 3586
Adj. R-sq 0.086 0.089 0.086 0.091 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.064
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
“_lag” indicates a lagged variable.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
174 D. Yang et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 165–177for the diﬀerent groups. Table 6 provides the relevant regression results, which indicate that in the weak media
monitoring group (columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), (11), (13) and (15)), the regression coeﬃcients of ZG1, ZG2,
ZG3 and ZG4 are signiﬁcantly positive. Comparing the results between the groups (columns (1) vs (2), (3) vs
(4), (5) vs (6), (7) vs (8), (9) vs (10), (11) vs (12), (13) vs (14) and (15) vs (16)), we ﬁnd the regression coeﬃcients
of ZG in the weak media monitoring group are nearly all signiﬁcantly higher than in the strong media mon-
itoring group.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 verify H2a. Using political connections to obtain long-term loans should be
understood as rent-seeking behavior. Given that rent-seeking behavior can be unreasonable or even illegal, in
a strong media monitoring environment, the use of political connections to obtain long-term loans is signif-
icantly reduced.5. Robustness tests
5.1. Variables
Following Fan et al. (2007), we consider whether only the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or former govern-
ment oﬃcial and the conclusions are not substantially changed.
We summarize the current or ex-government bureaucrat situations of both the CEO and chairman to
obtain new ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4 variables. For example, ZG1 equals 2 if both the CEO and the chairman
are current or former government oﬃcials. Similarly, ZG4 equals 5 if the CEO of the ﬁrm is a current or for-
Table 8
Regression results for model (2) (using lagged variables).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.409***
(0.000)
0.412***
(0.000)
0.410***
(0.000)
0.407***
(0.000)
1.228***
(0.000)
1.262***
(0.000)
1.232***
(0.000)
1.276***
(0.000)
ZG1_lag 0.006
(0.589)
0.060 (0.209)
ZG2_lag 0.013
(0.159)
0.100***
(0.008)
ZG3_lag 0.009
(0.212)
0.063**
(0.028)
ZG4_lag 0.008*
(0.062)
0.073***
(0.000)
Mc_lag 0.001
(0.497)
0.001
(0.698)
0.001
(0.642)
0.001
(0.597)
0.013**
(0.043)
0.019***
(0.009)
0.015**
(0.021)
0.022***
(0.002)
MCZG1_lag 0.002*
(0.092)
0.015
(0.282)
MCZG2_lag 0.002*
(0.085)
0.024**
(0.022)
MCZG3_lag 0.003*
(0.077)
0.016**
(0.046)
MCZG4_lag 0.001
(0.249)
0.017***
(0.000)
ROA_lag 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.407) (0.407) (0.411) (0.392) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grow_lag 0.000
(0.437)
0.000
(0.424)
0.000
(0.451)
0.000
(0.428)
0.000**
(0.044)
0.000**
(0.041)
0.000**
(0.049)
0.000**
(0.044)
Liq_lag 0.001***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.000)
TobinQ_lag 0.000
(0.822)
0.000
(0.872)
0.000
(0.808)
0.000
(0.969)
0.005 (0.111) 0.005 (0.118) 0.005 (0.111) 0.004 (0.135)
Tangible_lag 0.071***
(0.000)
0.072***
(0.000)
0.071***
(0.000)
0.072***
(0.000)
0.172***
(0.000)
0.172***
(0.000)
0.173***
(0.000)
0.173***
(0.000)
Size_lag 0.021***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
0.021***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 4175 4175 4175 4175 3586 3586 3586 3586
Adj. R-sq 0.215 0.216 0.215 0.217 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.219
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
“_lag” indicates a lagged variable.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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oﬃcial. We rebuild ZG1, ZG2, ZG3 and ZG4 and then test H1 and H2, and the conclusions are not substan-
tially changed.
We also control for other variables such as the level of regional markets and earnings management, with no
substantial changes.5.2. Endogeneity
We address the possibility of an endogeneity problem in two ways. First, we adopt lagged variables to per-
form regressions using models (1) and (2). Obviously, a ﬁrm’s long-term loans in the present year do not aﬀect
the political connections of the previous year. The regression results reported in Table 7 are consistent with
Table 9
Regression results for model (1) (using instrumental variables).
Variable The explanatory variable is Bank1 The explanatory variable is Bank2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.4441***
(0.0000)
0.1336
(0.4383)
1.6607***
(0.0000)
0.0303
(0.9606)
ZG1 0.1096
(0.1602)
0.5412*
(0.0608)
ZG2 0.5420*
(0.0709)
2.8686**
(0.0200)
ROA 0.0002 (0.2427) 0.0005**
(0.0362)
0.0008
(0.3201)
0.0005
(0.5453)
Grow 0.0001*
(0.0514)
0.0002***
(0.0033)
0.0002
(0.1485)
0.0007***
(0.0013)
Liq 0.0013***
(0.0000)
0.0055**
(0.0272)
0.0210***
(0.0000)
0.0008 (0.9369)
TobinQ 0.0002 (0.8344) 0.0020 (0.1533) 0.0033 (0.3376) 0.0148**
(0.0125)
Tangible 0.0483***
(0.0042)
0.0601***
(0.0024)
0.0923*
(0.0907)
0.1596**
(0.0171)
Size 0.0215***
(0.0000)
0.0036
(0.8122)
0.0783***
(0.0000)
0.0546
(0.3192)
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 5215 5215 4456 4456
Adj. R-sq 0.113 0.113 0.100 0.101
Note: The reported p-statistics in parentheses are two-way clustered at the ﬁrm and year levels.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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positive at the 10% signiﬁcance level, with the exception of columns (1) and (3).
The regression results reported in Table 8 are also consistent with those in Table 5. The regression coeﬃ-
cients of MCZG1_lag, MCZG2_lag, MCZG3_lag and MCZG4_lag) are negative and nearly all pass the sig-
niﬁcance test.
Second, we perform a two-stage regression based on instrumental variables. According to Sun et al. (2005),
the institutional environment can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s political connections and access to long-term loans and debt
maturities (Sun et al., 2005; Yu and Pan, 2008). Thus, we use a regional marketization index as an instrumen-
tal variable for political connections, and while we expect it to aﬀect long-term loans and debt maturities, it is
exogenous, such that long-term loans and debt maturities do not aﬀect the regional marketization level.
Following Hung et al. (2012), we perform an analysis using a two-stage regression. We begin by estimating
a ﬁrst-stage model and regressing the endogenous political connections variables (including ZG1 and ZG2) on
our instruments and controls. The explanatory variable is ZG1 (ZG2) and the regression variables include the
regional marketization index and the other control variables of model (1). We then use the predicted value of
ZG1 (ZG2) from the ﬁrst stage as the instrumental variable for this variable in the second stage. Table 9 shows
the results and hypothesis 1 is still supported.
6. Conclusion
This study uses a media supervision perspective to extend the research on political connections. We ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with political connections are more likely to gain long-term loans with extended debt maturities,
relative to other non-state-owned listed ﬁrms. The results suggest that it is popular for ﬁrms with political con-
nections to use them to access debt ﬁnancing. We further ﬁnd that this behavior decreases with increasing
media coverage, indicating that media monitoring restricts the use of political connections to a certain degree.
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analyze political connections, and despite their apparent diﬀerences, previous research has not managed to dis-
tinguish between them. Our study shows that the rent-seeking theory is more suitable for explaining the pres-
ence and functional mechanisms of political connections. That is, it is more reasonable to consider ﬁrms’
political relations as rent-seeking behavior than as a reputation eﬀect in the Chinese stock market.
In addition, this research has practical signiﬁcance. In China, the media’s role is highly suspect due to the
degree of government intervention. Houston et al. (2011) argue that the Chinese media should not play an
important role in curbing corruption, but we show that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb
corruption.
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